This department collection focuses on high-quality empirical and theoretical research on the organization, financing, and performance of healthcare delivery and insurance systems. The collection covers hospitals, physicians, and other providers, as well as public and private insurance markets.
The department welcomes contributions analyzing provider payment mechanisms and other incentives and their implications for provider behavior, resource allocation, cost containment, quality of care, access, efficiency, and health outcomes. It encourages rigorous work examining provider competition, market structure, vertical integration, and the design of financing schemes as well as research on supply-side health interventions and system-level reforms.
The department also invites analyses of insurance market dynamics, including adverse selection, risk selection, moral hazard, and the interaction between insurance design and provider incentives. Both reduced-form and structural empirical studies, as well as formal theoretical models, are within scope.
By advancing evidence and theory on how incentives operate across providers and insurers, the department aims to inform policy debates on sustainable, equitable, and high-performing health systems.